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Abstract 
The first-order temporal logics with o and o of time structures isomorphic to w (discrete linear 
time) and trees of o-segments (linear time with branching gaps) and some of its fragments are 
compared: the first is not recursively axiomatizable. For the second, a cut-free complete sequent 
calculus is given, and from this, a resolution system is derived by the method of Maslov. 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, various temporal logics have been studied and applied to the de- 
scription and analysis of dynamic properties of programs [7]. The investigations have 
focussed on discrete, linearly ordered, well-founded temporal structures because tem- 
poral states can then be identified with program states. It turns out that the first-order 
logics corresponding to this semantics are not recursively axiomatizable if q (hence- 
forth always) and o (nexttime) are present in the language: it is possible to characterize 
the set of natural numbers by 7 q -U(x), where U(x) holds for exactly one domain 
element at each state and is determined by a recursion in o (see [8]). This incomplete- 
ness result is based on a standard model of linear time; using correspondence theory 
one can obtain completeness results for first order temporal logic relative to classes 
of models of linear time (see [l]). With a change in the semantics (branching time 
gaps), however, a complete first-order logic can be obtained; this is the subject of 
the present paper. Our proof of completeness can be carried over to several types of 
future-oriented temporal operators (see [8]); there may be problems, however, if future- 
and past-oriented operators are present simultaneously. 
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For simplicity, we consider here only languages with q and o as the only temporal 
operators, and constants as the only function symbols. We compare the logic of discrete 
linear time TL to the logic of discrete linear time with branching time gaps TB. In 
both logics, the semantics of the temporal operators are as usual: a formula q A is true 
at a time point t, iff A is true at every time point b t; a formula OA is true at t, iff A is 
true at t + 1. The difference lies in the admitted time structures: for TL, this is the class 
of structures order isomorphic to o. We call such a structure an o-segment. In such a 
segment, there is always an earliest point, for every point there is a unique next point, 
and every point can be reached from the earliest point by passing finitely often to 
the next point. For TB, the admitted structures are isomorphic to (possibly infinitary) 
well-founded trees of o-segments. There is always a unique earliest next point in time, 
but also points “after the gap” (which cannot be reached by successively passing on 
to the next point) which are initial states in the next w-segments themselves, etc. 
We give a sequent calculus for TB, which is shown to be cut-free complete by an 
extension of Schiitte’s reduction tree method. The rules of the calculus constructed are 
not analytic in the sense that the formulas in the premises are not proper subformulas 
of the conclusion. Therefore, cut-free proofs in general lack the subformula property, 
a property essential for usual methods of proof search. The completeness proof shows, 
however, that we can salvage a large part of analytic@, enough to be able to construct 
a resolution system for the logic: Every valid sequent has a cut-free proof which uses 
only formulas A and oA, where A is a subformula of the end-sequent. Exploiting 
this property, we construct a complete resolution method for TB using the method of 
Maslov [9, 111. 
In a sense then, the investigations of TB can also be seen as a case study in (a) how 
far the completeness proof of Schiitte can be carried, and (b) how to overcome mild 
forms of non-analytic@. It also sheds some light on necessary conditions for the 
resolution calculus to be sound (completeness is not problematic). 
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the semantical structures underlying 
the logics TL and TB are introduced, and a proof of non-axiomatizability of TL is 
sketched. In Section 3 we present the sequent calculus LB for TB. The completeness 
proof for LB is presented in Section 4. Section 5 contains some remarks comparing 
(fragments of) TL and TB. The resolution system for TB is developed in Section 6. 
Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the significance of the completeness result 
for future applications. 
2. First-order temporal ogics 
We consider the following fist-order language: free variables a, b, c, ~1,. . .; bound 
variables x, y, z,xi, . . . ; constant symbols f, g, h, fi, . . .; predicate symbols (of arbitrary 
arity) P, Q, R, PI, . . .; propositional connectives A, V, 3, 1; quantifiers V, 3; and 
the temporal operators q (always), o (next time). Formulas are built up from the 
symbols as usual. The sometime operator o is introduced by definition: 4A E 10 -A. 
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IfA=*t... *n B, where *i is either q or o, then *r . . . *,, is called the temporal prefix 
of A. The semantics of a first-order temporal logic is defined as follows: 
Definition 2.1. Let T be a denumerable partially ordered set. T belongs to the class 
_Y of linear discrete orders iff it is order isomorphic to o; it belongs to the class g of 
linear discrete orders with branching aps iff it is order isomorphic to a well-founded 
tree of w-segments. 
Definition 2.2. Let 9 be 2 or 23, and let Frm(L) be the set of formulas over some 
first-order temporal language L. A structure K .for L is a tuple (T, {Di}fEr, {Si}itr), 
where T E .F, Di is a set called the domain at state i, D, C Di if i < j, Si is a function 
mapping free variables and constant symbols to elements of Di, and n-ary predicate 
symbols to functions from 0: to {T, I}. 
We define the valuation functions Ki from Frm(L) to {T,l.} as follows: Let A 
be a temporal formula, and not, and, or, imp1 be the truth functions for negation, 
conjunction, disjunction, and implication, respectively. 
(1) A -l’(t,,..., tn ): Ki(A) = Si(P)(Si(tl ), . . .) Si(tn 1). 
(2) A E 7B: Ki(A) = not(Ki(B)). 
(3) A E B A C: Ki(A) = and(Ki(B),K,(C)). 
(4) A z B V C: Ki(A) = or(Ki(B),K;(C)). 
(5) A c B > C: K,(A) = impl(Ki(B),Ki(C)). 
(6) A E (Vx)B(x): Ki(A) = T if Ki[d/x](A(d)) = T for every d E Di, and = I 
otherwise. 
(7) A E (Zx)B(x): K,(A) = T if Ki[d/x](A(d)) = T for some d E Di and = i 
otherwise. 
(8) A E q B: K;(A) = T if Kj(B) = T for every j>i and = I otherwise. 
(9) A E oB: Ki(A) = T if Ki+r(B) = T and = -L otherwise. 
A formula A is satis-ed in a temporal structure K, K k A, iff Ka(A) = T. A is valid 
in a class of temporal structures 5, Y + A, iff every K = (T, {Di}rEr, {Si}ier) with 
T E F satisfies A. 
Definition 2.3. The logic of linear discrete time TL is the set of all formulas A E 
Fm(L) s.t. 2’ /= A. The logic of linear discrete time with branching gaps TB is the 
set of all formulas ‘A E Frm(L) s.t. 28 b A. 
Example 2.4. In TL, the formula q o A E o q A is valid. In TB, however, only 
o q A > q OA holds. The other direction q oA > o q A does not hold in general, as can be 
seen by evaluating the formula on the countermodel K = (w+w, {Di}itw+w, {Si}iEw+w), 
where S,(A) = I and Si(A) = T for i < O, i > w. 
The semantics considered here is usually called initial semantics. Normal semantics 
is defined via truth in all states, not only in Ko. We will need the following lemma 
later on. 
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Lemma 2.5. Let A be a formula. 
(1) k A ifs A is true in every world in every temporal structure. 
(2) k=A $+=A. 
(3) k:A ifSboA. 
Proof. (1) If: trivial. Only if: Let T be a temporal structure in which A is not true 
at a state i. Consider T’ = {j E T ( jai}: T’ is also a temporal structure, and, since 
our logics contain no operators acting backwards in time, A is true at state i in T’ if 
it was true in state i in T. But i is the initial state in T’. 
(2) If: by the truth definition of q . Only if: immediate by (1). 
(3) If: Let T be a structure where A is false in the initial world. Consider T’ = TUO’ 
with 0’ < 0, and So, = SO. The addition of a state before the initial state does not 
change the truth of formulas in T. But in T’, oA is false in the initial world. Only if: 
immediate by (1). 0 
Remark 2.6. The logics we consider differ from the ones in the literature in that we 
do not use global and local variables, but the interpretation of predicate symbols can 
vary over the states. This is more in keeping with the tradition in quantificational 
modal logics. However, by using the Barcan formulas for q and o, definable two- 
sortedness and other expressible concepts, most effects of global and local variables 
can be simulated. Another minor difference is in the definition of q : Kroger’s q is 
defined via truth in all later worlds; in Kroger’s logic, our q can be defined by q A AA, 
his q can be expressed by o q A in TL. 
As indicated in the introduction, the logic TL is not axiomatizable. This was shown 
for the original formulation of Kroger by Szalas [ 121 and Kroger [8]. Two binary 
function symbols have to be present for the results to hold. If the operator until 
is also present, or if quantification over local variables is allowed, then the empty 
signature suffices, as was shown by Szalas and Holenderski [ 131 and Kroger [8], 
respectively. 
Following Szalas [ 121 and Kroger [8] we sketch a proof for the incompleteness 
result for TL with equality, where the signature contains two binary function symbols 
(equivalently, two ternary predicate symbols): 
Let ’ designate the successor function, and the constant 0 the number zero. Consider 
the formula axiomatizing the predicate U, 
U(0) A q (Vx)(U(x) = (3y)(y =x’ A oU(y))) A q (vX)(vy)(u(x) A U(y)>x = y). 
In every model, oU(x) represents exactly the set of natural numbers. If the lan- 
guage is expressive enough, we can write down the usual axioms for addition and 
multiplication (e.g., Robinson’s Q). A sentence of arithmetic is true in the natu- 
ral numbers iff its relativization to o U(X) follows in TL from these axioms. 
The non-axiomatizability of TL thus follows from Giidel’s Incompleteness 
Theorems. 
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3. A sequent calculus for TB 
In the standard definition a sequent is an expression of the form 
A ,,..., Ak -+ B ,,..., BI, 
where the Ai and Bj are first-order formulas. For the purpose of completeness proofs 
it is more convenient to use instead infinite sequents (see, e.g., Takeuti’s book [14, 
Ch. 1.81). More precisely, the completeness theorem requires a generalization of fi- 
nite sequences of formulas to countably infinite well-ordered sequences. We will use 
this more general notion of sequents and indicate the use of finite sequents 
explicitly. 
Let A be a countable (possibly finite) well-ordered sequence. If A is order isomorphic 
to the well-ordered set of numbers c1 via a mapping 4 s.t. 4(i) = A; for i E CY then we 
write A = (Ai)iEcc. 
Definition 3.1. A sequent is an expression of the form r -+ A, where r and A are 
countable well-ordered sequences of first-order temporal formulas. 
Definition 3.2. The sequence (Ai)iEa is called a subsequence of (Ai)iEb if c( C j3 and 
there exists an order-preserving l-l mapping $ : c1 -+ #?. If the sequences are finite 
and p = (1,. . . ,n} then c1 is of the form {ii,. . .,ik} c{l,. . . ,n}. A sequent r’ --f 
A’ is called a subsequent of r + A if r’ and A’ are subsequences of r and A, 
respectively. 
Definition 3.3. Let (Si)iE.o be a sequence of sequents s.t. Sj = ni + ni for i E w. 
Then the sequent S = (ZZi)iE, + (ni)iE, is called the union sequent of (S;)iEu. 
Note that the order type of (ZTi)iE, is characterized by the property: if i < j and 
a;, aj are the well-ordered sets of numbers corresponding to ni and II,, respectively 
then all elements of ai are smaller than all elements of aj. 
The validity of finite sequents is defined as usual: Al,. . . ,Ak + BI,. . . ,Bk is valid 
in TL (TB) iff (A, A...AAk)>(BI V... V Bl) is valid in TL (TB). A finite sequent 
is provable if it has a derivation in a suitable calculus. 
The concepts of provability (defined for finite sequents originally) can be extended 
to the infinite case via the usual compactness condition given below. 
Definition 3.4. A (not necessarily finite!) sequent S is called provable if there exists 
a finite subsequent of S which is provable. 
It is only a matter of convention that we use the term “provable” for infinite sequents, 
as LB works only on finite sequents. This convention is, however, of essential advan- 
tage in completeness proofs. In our completeness proof we do not need the semantics 
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of infinite sequents; particularly we do not speak about (semantic) compactness (i.e. 
about the property that an infinite sequent is valid iff there exists a finite subsequent 
which is valid). 
As basis for the sequent calculus LB for TB we take a variant of Gentzen’s calculus 
LK for classical predicate logic. The rules of LK are well-known and can be found 
e.g., in [14]. We use a weakening friendly formulation of the rules: the side formulas 
in the premises of the rules (A:right), (V:left), and (>:left) are not required to be 
identical, e.g., 
T-A r’ --t A’,B r + A,A r + A,B 
1-,I-’ + A,A’,A AA instead of r+A,AAB 
LB consists of the rules of LK plus the following rules for o and q : 
A,ooA,r + A 
0: left 
r + A,A r’ --f A’,ooA 
q A,riA r, r’ + A, A’, q A 
q : right 
T+A or++A 
or+ oA 
nex 
or--toA 
net 
Note that LB (like LK) is defined for finite sequents only. If r is Al,. , . ,A,,, then 
or denotes the sequence oA,,. . . , oA, (similarly for or). The notations or and 
or can be extended to infinite sequents in a straightforward way (e.g., Oar@ = 
(oA;)ica). Note that, unlike the rules of LK, the rules (o:left) and (o:right) are 
not analytic (i.e., the subformula property does not hold). The rule (nex) works 
on the left and right sides of the sequent simultaneously (but is analytic) and 
(net) is “context dependent”. It is clear that (net) corresponds to the necessitation 
rule common in Hilbert-style modal calculi. When using rules with two auxiliary 
formulas in one premise (i.e., (>:right) or (o:left)), the inference is admitted even 
if only one formula is actually present (implicit weakening). Alternatively, we 
could have split the rule into two, in a similar way as the (V:right) and (A:left) 
rules. Otherwise, the notion of proof is the standard one (cf. [ 14, Ch. 1, Section 21). 
In particular, recall that initial sequents are of the form A --) A (A any formula) 
and cut-free provable means having a proof not containing an application 
of the cut rule. The sequent appearing at the root of the proof tree is called 
end-sequent. 
Proposition 3.5. If a sequent is LB-provable, then a (non-empty) subsequent isprov- 
able without weakenings. 
Proof. This is easily seen by induction on the length of the proof, and is due to the 
special formulation of the rules. 0 
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Example 3.6. We give an LB-proof of the formula o q A > q oA. 
A--+A P 0: left 
DA 
ooA - 
--+A 
- nex 
+oA 
0:left 
S/!- net 
ooA nex 
oooA 
q : right 
oqli--pA qh; A4.2 q A + 
ooA 4 oA 1 0OA+ 
onA,ooA -+ q OA 
contrleft . . . ooA+_ ~~ ooA _ 
--+ ooA>ooA 
X:ngnt 
Note that, on the right branch of the proof, we introduced q A twice on the left-hand 
side of a sequent. This is necessary because of the way (nex) introduces o in all 
formulas of the sequent. 
Theorem 3.7. LB is sound for TB, i.e., every finite LB-provable sequent is valid 
in TB. 
Proof. It is sufficient to prove the soundness of the LB-rules. The soundness of the 
LK-part is proved as usual. The soundness of the rules q :left and q :right follows from 
the “recursion” equivalence of q A and ooA A A in the TB-semantics. The soundness 
of (nex) follows from Lemma 2.5(3) and from the fact that o distributes over the 
propositional connectives (e.g., o(A A B) is equivalent to OA A oB). The soundness of 
(net) follows from Lemma 2.5(2), from the TB-equivalence of q A and ooA, from the 
distributivity of q over A, and from the fact that q (A > B) implies q A > q B. q 
If we look closely at the rules of LB we notice that (o:left) and (o:right) are not 
strictly analytical. Therefore it is convenient to extend the usual notion of subformula. 
Note that we have disjoint sets of free and bound variables. A term is defined as usual 
but subject to the restriction that it may only contain free variables; if also bound 
variables are allowed to occur we speak about semi-terms. Similarly we distinguish 
between formulas and semi-formulas. The concept of strict sub-semi-formula represents 
the intuitive notion of subformula, while the definition of semi-formulas takes care of 
the non-analytic behaviour of o and q . 
Definition 3.8. Let F be a formula. The set ssf(F) of strict sub-semi-formulas of F 
is defined as ssf(F) = {F} UC(F), where 
1 
{FI if F is atomic, 
z(F) = ssf(A) if F E *A for * E (7, q , o}, 
ssf(A) U ssf(B) if F E A * B for * E {A, V, I}, 
ssf(&)) if F E (&)A (x) for Q E {V, 3). 
The set sub(F) of sub-semi-formulas of F is defined by 
sub(F) = ssf(F) u {ooA 1 q A E ssf(F)). 
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By sub*(F) we denote the set of formulas obtained from sub(F) by replacing bound 
variables without matching quantifier in each member of sub(F) by free variables 
or constant symbols (i.e., we obtain actual subformulas corresponding to the semi- 
formulas). 
4. Completeness of LB 
The main result of this paper is the following theorem. 
Theorem 4.1. LB is complete for TB: every finite TB-valid sequent S has a cut-free 
LB-proof from atomic axioms. 
The proof requires some additional definitions and technical lemmata. In order to 
emphasize the main lines of the argument we give a rough sketch of the proof in 
advance: 
The proof uses a variant of &ht.&e’s method of reduction trees as modified for 
intuitionistic logic with Kripke semantics by [14, Ch. 1, Section 81. It proceeds by 
exhibiting a countermodel for any given unprovable sequent in the following way. 
Let us assume that S: r -+ A is unprovable. We first generate a reduction tree by 
reverse application of all the rules of LB except (nex) and (net). This tree contains 
a branch B(S) consisting of unprovable sequents only. We form the union sequent of 
B(S) and extract from it the subsequent OTB + OAB consisting of all formulas of the 
form oA. By reverse application of (nex) we arrive at the sequent rs -+ de, which 
is unprovable as well. For this sequent, we repeat the construction of a reduction tree. 
By iterating this procedure we obtain an infinite sequence N of reduction branches, all 
of them containing unprovable sequents only. Now we take the union sequent of the 
sequence of all sequents contained in these branches. In turn, we extract a subsequent 
q r~ + q AN consisting of all formulas of the form q A, but with the following re- 
striction: q A is in q AN only if it occurs in infinitely many reduction branches of the 
sequence N. If q AN is the empty sequence we have completed our construction and ob- 
tain a countermodel, otherwise we continue as follows. By construction, q r,v -+ q AN 
is unprovable, and so is any subsequent of the form q rN -+ q A, for any formula q A 
occurring in q AN. We then repeat the whole construction for all sequents q r,v --f A 
(note that these are unprovable too). This gives us a possibly infinite and possibly 
infinitary tree of infinite chains of reduction branches containing unprovable sequents 
only. This tree is contained in 23 and we obtain from it a countermodel for the original 
sequent S: r -+ A. 
Definition 4.2. The reduction tree R(S) of a sequent S: r -+ A is an infinite, infini- 
tary tree (i.e., the nodes may be of infinite degree) s.t. the set of nodes is a set of 
(occurrences of) sequents. R(S) is defined in stages as follows: 
Stage 0: Ro consists of S alone (S is the root node of R(S)). 
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Stage k + 1: Suppose that the reduction tree Rk has already been constructed. In 
order to construct Rk+l we need some additional terminology. Let B be a branch (i.e., 
a maximal path starting from the root) in &. We call B closed if it is finite and its 
end sequent 17 + A contains an atomic formula which is contained in both II and A; 
otherwise B is called open. The free variables occurring in the sequents of a branch B 
are called the available variables of B; if there are none, pick any free variable and 
call it available. Note that our sequents may be infinite and thus there may be infinitely 
many free variables even on a finite branch. Since in the definition of Rk+, there may 
be nodes of uncountable degree we need an uncountable supply of free variables (note 
that this poses no problem, as R(S) is a semantic structure and not an actual proof 
tree). Constants occurring in S (by construction no new constants are generated) are 
treated like available variables. The reduction applies to any top sequent (i.e., leaf 
sequent) of Rk. The method is a generalization of the first-order case (which applies 
to 1) A, V, >, ‘d, 3) by extending it to the case of q . For the time being, we postpone 
treatment of o. Concerning formulas with outermost logical symbols among 7, A, V, 
>, ‘d, 3 we proceed as in [14]. We present only some typical cases and omit most of 
the details. The principle is that of decomposing formulas according to their outermost 
logical symbol. In order to avoid reducing formulas more often than needed, we mark 
formulas as “treated” once the reduction has been applied to them. 
In the first step the root sequent contains only unmarked formulas. So let us assume 
that S’: II + A is a leaf node of a branch B in &. 
(al) Outermost logical symbol A (left reduction): 
Let (Ai A Bl)iE1 be the subsequence of 17 consisting of unmarked formulas with outer- 
most logical symbol A. Then we define S”: (A,,Bi)lEa,IZ+A and add the edge (S’,S”) 
to &. Mark the thus reduced formulas (Ai A B;)iEx in S”. 
(a2) Outermost logical symbol A (right reduction): 
Here let (AiABi)iEl be the subsequence of A consisting of all unmarked formulas with 
outermost logical symbol A. Let A(S’) = { l7 + A,(Ci),,, 1 Ci = A; or C; = Bi}. For 
every S” E A(S’) add S” and the edge (S’, S”) to & and mark the formulas (AiABi)lEa 
therein. Note that the node S’ has an uncountable degree in the new tree &+I if CI is 
an infinite ordinal. 
We skip the definition for the other propositional connectives and refer the reader 
to [14]. 
(bl ) Outermost logical symbol V (left reduction): 
Let ((VX~),~;(X;))~~~ be the subsequence of II consisting of all unmarked formulas with 
outermost logical symbol V. Let (ai)iEp be a sequence consisting of all free variables 
on the branch B from S to S’. Note that all sequents are countable and the length of B 
is finite; thus /I is a countable ordinal again. We define S”: ( (Ai(aj))iEp)iEU, I7 + A 
and add S” and the edge (S’, S”) to Rk. 
(b2) Outermost logical symbol V (right reduction): 
Let ((VxiZqi(xi))iEor be th e subsequence of ,4 consisting of all unmarked formulas 
with outermost logical symbol ‘d. Create a sequence (bi)iEa of free variables which do 
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not occur in any sequent constructed so far. We define S”: II + A, (A;(bi))iEu and 
add S” and the edge (S’,S”) to &. Mark the formulas (VXixi>A(Xi) for i E a in the 
consequent of the new sequent S”. 
The construction for 3 is completely symmetric to the case of V. 
(cl) Outermost logical symbol q (left reduction): 
Let (OAi)iEa be the subsequence of all formulas in Il which are unmarked and have 
III as outermost symbol. Let S”: (Ai, OOAi)iE,, Il + n and add S” and the the edge 
(S’, S”) to Rk. Mark all formulas q Ai for i E a in il of S”. Note that, like in the other 
cases, the form of S” is obtained by applying q :left “backwards.” 
(~2) Outermost logical symbol q (right reduction): 
Let (UAi)iEm be the subsequence of all formulas in /i which are unmarked and have 
q as outermost logical symbol. Let p(S’) = { ZI + /I, (Ci)icm 1 Ci = Ai or Ci = wAi} 
and add S” and the edge (S’,S”) to Rk for every S” E p(S). Note that, like in case 
(a2) above, the degree of the node S’ in Rk+l is uncountable provided c1 is infinite. 
Finally, mark the formulas OAi for i E tl in n of S”. 
As already indicated we do not introduce reduction rules for o here. Suppose 
none of the reduction rules for 7, A, V, 3, t/, 3 or q apply and the branch 
B (from S to S’) is open. Then we simply add a copy Sh of S’ and the edge 
(S’,SA) to Rk. (Note that we work with occurrences of sequents, not merely 
sequents. The reduction therefore indeed produces a tree, and not a cyclic 
graph. ) 
In order to guarantee that all formulas in the sequents are eventually processed, 
we postulate a “clockwise” order in reducing 7, A, V, 3, V, 3, q . If we take the 
order as given, we reduce 1 first, then A, etc. After having reduced q on all se- 
quents we start with 7 again. Since reduced formulas in (V:right) (and (3:lefi) re- 
ductions are not marked, these formulas can be reduced infinitely often. Without pos- 
tulating such a clockwise order, open branches would not define countermodels in 
general. 
By the above construction we obtain an (infinite) sequence of trees which is 
monotonic. Thus, by taking the union over the sets of vertices and edges, we ob- 
tain the limit tree R,. R, is precisely the tree R(S) we intended to 
construct. 
Note that our construction, if applied to formulas neither containing o nor q , 
yields the familiar construction of a counterexample in classical predicate logic. 
Indeed, if A is such a formula which is not valid (in the standard first-order 
semantics) we obtain an infinite open branch B representing a counterexample. 
Our construction, however, is not completed so far. In fact, we may obtain open 
branches in R(S) even for sequents valid in TB. Note that in the construction 
of R(S) itself we cannot obtain infinite sequents provided the root 
sequent is finite. But in some further constructions we will obtain infinite 
sequents out of infinite branches and apply the method of reduction trees to these 
sequents as well. Let us illustrate the construction of R(S) by a simple example 
(cf. also Example 3.6). 
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Example 4.3. Let S be --+ ooA > q oA. The tree R(S) is given below: 
onA-+onoA ooA + OA 
onA+onoA ooA -+ OA 
2 q : right red /” 
ooA-+ooA 
T > : right red 
+ooA> ooA 
R(S) possesses two open infinite branches. As o q A > q oA is TB-valid, these open 
branches do not represent counterexamples. On the other hand we will prove that 
for unprovable sequents there are always branches in the reduction tree containing 
unprovable sequents only. Take for example S’: -+ q o A > oo A. We already know that 
S’ is not TB-valid. R(P) is the following tree consisting of one infinite branch only: 
oA,oooA--rooA 
T 
oA,oooA--rooA 
T (0: right) red 
q oA--tonA 
T (3 : right) red 
+ooA> ooA 
It is easy to verify that the branch contains only sequents which are not valid in TB. 
Clearly, by soundness of LB, these sequents are all unprovable. 
In the case of LK, finite sequents, and an unprovable end-sequent S we obtain a 
tree R(S) with the following property: If S’ is an unprovable sequent in R(S), then 
there is a successor of S’ in R(S) which is also unprovable. As R(S) must be infinite 
and its node degree finite, there is an infinite branch by Kiinig’s Lemma. This infinite 
branch consists of unprovable sequents only and represents a counterexample. This 
argument obviously yields the completeness of LK. 
In the case of infinite sequents S there may be nodes in R(S) of uncountable degree. 
This phenomenon occurs if, in a sequent S’ occurring in R(S), we have infinitely many 
formulas containing an outermost logical operator with a binary reduction rule (e.g., 
(A:right) or (a:right)). It is, however, still possible to prove the existence of an infinite 
branch containing unprovable sequents. For this purpose we will use a generalization 
of Kiinig’s Lemma due to Takeuti [14]. 
Definition 4.4. Let a be a set and { ?Vi}iEa be a family of sets indexed by a. If 
f E niEcr, Wi and al 2 a then f is called a partial function (over a) with domain 
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domf = ~1~. If domf = CI then f is called total. If f and g are partial functions s.t. 
domf = Do C dom g and f(x) = g(x) for all x E Do, then we call g an extension of 
f and write f + g and f = g 1 DO. 
Theorem 4.5 (Takeuti [14, p. 51f]). Let c( be a set and { E’iYi)iEa be a family ofjnite 
sets. Let P be a property of partial functions over c1 s. t. 
(1) P(f) holds isf there exists a jinite subset N C cc, s. t. P( f 1 N) holds. 
(2) P(f) holds for every total f. 
Then there exists a finite subset NO C CI s. t. P( f ) holds for every f with NO G domf. 
Lemma 4.6. Let R(S) be the reduction tree of a (possibly injinite) unprovable se- 
quent S. Then R(S) has a branch B(S) containing unprovable sequents only. Such a 
branch is called a reduction branch of R(S). 
Proof. We have to show that, in R(S), a sequent S’ is unprovable iff there exists a 
successor S” of S’ s.t. S” is unprovable. Equivalently: 
(*) If all successors of a sequent node S’ are provable then S’ itself is provable. 
Using transfinite induction on trees (by ordering trees according to the standard subset 
relation) we derive from (*): If S is unprovable, then there exists an infinite reduction 
branch in R(S) (every maximal finite branch must end in a provable sequent). Thus, by 
(*), every path leading to an unprovable sequent can be extended. Note again that the 
degree of some nodes in R(S) may be uncountable, but branches in R(S) are always 
countable! Thus it remains to prove (*): 
Case 1: S’ is of degree 1: The rule used for the reduction of S’ has only one premise, 
e.g., (V:right), (3:left), (o:left). Then S’ has only one successor S”. Let us assume that 
S” is provable. By definition of provability (of infinite sequents) there exists a finite 
subsequent S{ of S” which is provable too. Now let B1, . . . , B, be the formulas in S{ 
obtained by reduction using some rule (let us call it p). Then, by repeated application 
of p on the Bi combined with contractions and exchanges, we obtain a finite subsequent 
SA of S’ which is provable too; the proof of St can be easily extended to a proof of 
S& 
Case 2: S’ is of degree > 1 (possibly of uncountable degree): The rule correspond- 
ing the reduction of this node must be binary, e.g., (V:left), (o:right). By definition of 
a reduction tree the successors of S’ must be of the form 
Il -+ A (Ci,,l )iEa or (Cj,,i)rEa, n -+ 4 
where for all i E CI we have ji E (0, 1) depending on which (of the two) subformu- 
las occurs in position i. Moreover, for every sequence (ji)iEa there exists a successor 
corresponding to this sequence. In the argument to follow it does not matter whether 
the rule under consideration is a left or a right rule. Thus, we restrict attention to the 
case where p is a right rule and the reduced sequent is 
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Now let Wi = (0, I} for every i E CL and f denote functions in niEa Wi (= (0, I}a). 
Let us assume that all successors of S’ are provable. Then to every successor S” of 
S’ there corresponds exactly one f E (0, 1 }“. Thus if S” corresponds to f we write 
S” = S”[f 1. Since S”[f ] is provable there exists a finite subsequent S:[f ] of S”[ f ] 
which is provable too. This means, for every total f (see Definition 4.4) there is a finite 
subsequent $‘[f ] of S”[f] s.t. S:[ f ] is provable. Hence, for S’ = Zl -+ A, (Cj,,i)i E a 
and every f E (0, l}’ we obtain a finite provable subsequent S{[f ] of the form 
l7j + Af3(Cj,,ika~~ 
where ~11 is a finite subset of CI. 
Let CII = {il, . . , in} be an arbitrary finite subset of CI and let f E {O,l}OL’. Then we 
call the finite sequence of formulas 
(C/.(ilbil,. . .2 Cf(i.),i.) 
selected for f if there are finite subsequences l7f, /If of IZ, A, respectively, st. Ilf -+ 
A’3 (C/(i),i)iEzl is provable. By the explications above, there are such subsequences for 
every f. Hence, there exist selected sequences for every total f. 
In order to apply Takeuti’s theorem we have to define a property P of partial func- 
tions over R. We choose: 
P(f) _ (31 E 0)(3il,.. .,i, E domf)(Cf(i,),i,,. . ., C/(i.~i~) is selected. 
P(f) obviously satisfies both conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem 4.5. Thus, Takeuti’s 
theorem applies and there exists a finite set ~10 = {rl,. . . , t-1) C CI s.t. if CIO C domf then 
P(f) holds. We define 
F = {f 1 domf = ~1~) 
Then F is a finite set and P(f) holds for all f E F. But this means that for every 
f E F there exists ~1,. . . , Sk E Ro (= domf) s.t. (CY(~,,,~,, . . . , CJ(~~),.~~) is selected, i.e., 
there exists a finite subsequence nf, Af of IZ, A s.t. 
nf + /if, C/es, ),s, 2 . . ., Cf(st ),a 
is provable. Now the set (0, l}” is isomorphic to {O,l}{‘~.~~~‘), the set of all binary 
sequences of length 1. Thus for every such binary sequence jI = (il,. . . , ii) there exist 
finite subsequences IIlfl, Ap of 17, A s.t. 
S’: np + LIB, Ci,,,, , , . . , Ci,,,, 
is provable. We see that the Ci,,,,,. . . ,Ci,,,, for (il,. . .,il) E (0, I}{‘,...,‘) (= Bj) are ex- 
actly the reduction formulas obtained from the reduction of the finite subsequent Sh: f70 - 
Ao, C,, , . . . , C,, where Ilo is the union sequence of (ZI~)~EB, and A0 is the union se- 
quence of (A~)B~B,. By repeated application of the binary rule p under consideration 
we can derive SA from the sequents S 6. Together with the respective LB-proofs of 
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the SF we obtain a proof of SA. But Sh is a finite subsequence of S’ and thus S’ is 
provable. 0 
Note that in order to prove Lemma 4.6 we made use of the compactness of the 
provability concept (which holds by definition). We did not use (semantic) compactness 
of the logic TB and do not even claim that TB is indeed compact. 
So far we know that for unprovable sequents S, there must be an infinite branch 
containing only unprovable sequents (i.e., a reduction branch) in R(S). In our next step 
we “pass” the ordinal o in our construction and obtain infinite sequents out of finite 
ones (note that, if S is finite, then R(S) contains only finite sequents). The basic idea 
is to construct (infinite) unprovable sequents out of reduction branches and iterate this 
procedure infinitely often. 
Definition 4.7. Let S be an unprovable sequent and B be a reduction branch in R(S). 
Let S’ be the union sequent of B (see Definition 3.3) and Sh: (OAi)iEa -+ (OBj)jEp be 
the subsequent of S’ consisting of all formulas in S’ with outermost logical symbol o. 
Let St be (Ai)iEa 4 (Bj)/Eb (this is the sequent SO ’ “stripped” of its outermost o’s). 
Then S{ is called the successor of S w.r.t. B. 
Lemma 4.8. Let S be an unprovable sequent and B be a reduction branch in R(S) 
and let S’ be the successor of S w.r. t. B. Then S’ is unprovable. 
Remark 4.9. By Lemma 4.6 we know that R(S) must have a reduction branch; thus 
the assumption of the lemma can always be fulfilled and S’ exists. 
Proof. Let S’ be (Ai)rEm -+ (Bj)/tp. Assume, by way of contradiction, that S’ is 
provable. By definition of provability, there is a finite subsequent S”:Ai,, . . _ ,Ai, + 
B. ,,, . . . , Bj, of S’ which is LB-provable. But from S” we can derive (in one step), 
using (nex), the sequent Sr: OAi,, . . . , OA, + OBj,, . . . , OBj,. Since S’ is the successor 
of S w.r.t. B, by Definition 4.7, Sy is a finite subsequent of the union sequent U(B) 
of B. Thus if B = (S2)rEw there exists a finite initial segment B’ = (SI,. _ .,S,,) of B, 
with St = S and so that the union sequent U(B’) of B’ contains ,I$‘. Let left(Ii’ + A) 
denote the set of all formulas in II, and right(I7 -+ A) denote the set of all formulas 
in A. By construction of R(S) we have that left(&) G lef?(Sj) and right($) c right(Sj) 
for 1 bidjdn. Hence, left( U(B’)) = left(&) and right( U(B’)) = right(S,,). In other 
words, Sy is a finite subsequent of S,,. Sy is provable and thus S, is provable, too. But 
this is impossible because S is a reduction branch. Hence, S’ must be unprovable. q 
Definition 4.10. Let Sr be an unprovable sequent. A next-time sequence is an infinite 
sequence of reduction branches (Bi)iew s.t. BI is a reduction branch of Sr, and for 
every i > 2, Bi is a reduction branch of a successor Si of Si_ 1 w.r.t. Bi- 1. All variables 
occurring in Bi are available for the construction of Bi+l (i.e., for the reductions V:left 
and 3:right). 
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Note that, by Lemma 4.8, next-time sequences exist for all improvable sequents. 
This is easily seen by induction. 
Example 4.11. We construct a next-time sequence N(Sr ) corresponding to the sequent 
S: q o A -+ ooA. The following sequence is a reduction branch in R(Si): 
B,:S,;oA,oooA,ooA+ooA;oA,oooA,ooA-+ooA;... . 
The union sequent of B1 is o A, o q oA, q o A -+ o q A. Therefore the successor of Sr 
w.r.t. BI is 
&:A, ooA -+ q A. 
For S2 we obtain a reduction branch of the form 
B2:S2;A, q OA 4 ooA;oA, oooA,A, ooA + onA;... 
with the union sequent oA, oooA,A, q O A -+ onA. The successor of Sl w.r.t. 82 is 
S, =S, =A,ooA-+oA 
In general, S, = S2 = A, q oA + q A and B, = B2 for i > 3. 
The sequents in a next-time sequence represent necessary conditions for a sequent 
S to be true: If S is true at time point 0, then Si is true at point 1, S, at 2, etc. But these 
conditions are not sufficient. Let us look at the sequent Sr : q o A + ooA. We know 
that Sr is not TB-valid. Let us assume that Si is true at time point 1. Then the sequent 
S2: A, q o A -+ q A is true at time point 2 and at time k we would have A, q oA + q A 
being true. According to our semantics there is a counterexample to the sequent S2 
at every time point k E w. But recall that at time point o we may set A to false. 
Note that w is not a successor ordinal. Thus in order to construct counterexamples to 
sequents we have to “jump” across time gaps; this jump will be performed via reverse 
application of the necessitation rule. 
Definition 4.12. Let S be an unprovable sequent. A gapjump tree G(S) for S is a tree 
with nodes consisting of next-time sequences satisfying the following conditions: 
(1) The root of G(S) is a next-time sequence of S. 
(2) Let N be a next-time sequence in G(S) corresponding to a sequent S’. Then 
(N, Ni), i E CC, are edges in G(S) if the N; are constructed as follows: Let N = (Bi)iED 
and II’ + A’ be the union sequent of N (i.e., II’ -+ A’ is the union sequent of the 
union sequents of the Bi). Let q Zl,v be the subsequence of all formulas in Z7’ with 
outermost logical symbol q . on N is a subsequence of A’ obtained in the following 
way: delete all formulas in A’ except formulas of the form q A, where q A occurs in 
the right-hand sides of infinitely many successor sequents in N. Thus we obtain a 
sequent of the form 
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and define a next-time sequence Ni for every q IZ,v --f Ai (i E a), provided q ZZ, -+ Ai 
is unprovable. 
If q /i~ is empty then N is a leaf in G(S). 
In the definition of the next-time sequence Ni all free variables available for the 
construction of N are available for the construction of Ni too (for the V:lefi and 3:right 
reduction in the reduction branches). 
If q A, is empty then, according to Definition 4.12, the node corresponding to N 
must be a leaf. But even if q & is non-empty it might be the case that the sequents 
q IZN + Ai are provable and thus do not define new next-time sequences. We will see 
in Lemma 4.14 that such a case cannot occur. 
Example 4.13. We construct a gapjump tree with root N(Si), where N(S) is the 
next-time sequence of Example 4.11. For N = (B.). , ,>i we had Bi = B2 for i>2 and 
Bz:A,ooA -+oA;A,ooA + ooA;oA,oooA,A,ooA + ooA;... 
B1 starts with q OA -+ ooA, so we obtain as union sequent of N: 
q oA,A,oA,oooA,ooA ,... +oA,ooA ,... 
where formulas (if we do not use contraction) may be repeated infinitely many times. 
Note that in all the successors Si+i w.r.t. Bi we have Si+i = A,ooA + DA for i E o 
and thus q A occurs infinitely often on the right side. Hence, q 17~ + q AN = q o A + 
q A. We have to consider only the single sequent S’: q o A -+ A. The only edge leaving 
N(Si ) in G(Si ) is (N(Si ), N(S’)). A next-time sequence N(S’) for S’ is easily obtained. 
We construct the reduction tree for S’ and find a reduction branch Bo with successor 
sequent S”: A, q o A --+. It is immediately clear that the successor sequents will be 
repeated infinitely often. A next-time sequence for S’ is N(S’) = (Bi)icw, where 
BO=uoA + A;oA,ouoA,uoA + A;... 
B, =A,ooA +;oA,ooA,A,ooA +;... 
Bi = B1 for all i 2 1 
N(S’) is a leaf node of the gapjump tree, since there is no formula of the form q A 
occurring in infinitely many successor sequents on the right-hand side (in fact, there 
are no such formulas at all). 
In defining the gapjump tree we have constructed a sequent of the form S’: q IAN + 
q & where q & contains only formulas appearing infinitely many times. S’ can be 
“extracted” from the next-time sequence N, which is also a node in the tree. If the 
consequent of S’ is empty then clearly N is a leaf in the gapjump tree. Otherwise we 
obtain sequents of the form q ZlN + Ai, where UAi OCCUTS in q AN. We call S’ the 
o-extract of N and every sequent S”: q l7, + A for q A in q & a right reduct of 5”. 
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(The term “right reduct” should not be confused with the (o:right) reduction of S’, 
which has a different form.) 
Lemma 4.14. Let N be a node in a gapjump tree G(S’) for unprovable S’ and S be 
the o-extract of N. Zf the consequent of S is not empty then every right reduct of S 
is unprovable. 
Remark 4.15. A consequence of this lemma is that every right reduct defines a next- 
time sequence and thus a successor node of N. 
Proof. Let S: q IZN + q AN be the o-extract of N s.t. q AN is not empty, and let q A 
be a formula in q AN. 
Assume, by way of contradiction, that S’: 017~ + A is provable. By definition of 
provability there is a finite subsequent S”: q I$, + A(, of S’ s.t. S” is provable. AX is 
either empty or A alone. 
If Ah is empty then S” is a subsequent of the union sequent of N (recall that N is 
a next-time sequence). We show that there exists a successor sequent Si of a branch 
Bi-i in N s.t. •I lY$, is a subsequence of the antecedent of Si: Let q C be a formula 
in q n;. q C occurs in some sequent SC in a reduction branch B in N. By definition 
of a reduction branch, on C must occur in almost all descendents of SC and thus 
also in the union sequent ((o:left) reduction). By definition of a successor sequent, the 
successor w.r.t. B must contain UC in the antecedent. Moreover, UC must occur in all 
further successor sequents in N. As q n(, is a finite sequence there must be a successor 
sequent Sj of a reduction branch Bj-1 s.t. q lib is subsequence of the antecedent of Sj. 
But then Sj would be provable, which contradicts Lemma 4.8. 
If Aly = A then, like in the case where Aly is empty above, we obtain a successor 
sequent Si in N s.t. q Il(, is a subsequence of the antecedent of S,. By definition of 
a o-extract, the formula q A must occur in infinitely many Sj’s. Observe that q l7; 
is a subsequent of the antecedents of all Sj for j>i. Therefore, there must be a k 
s.t. q l7; -+ q A is a subsequent of Sk. If S”: q ll(, + A is, as we assumed, provable, 
then so is S”‘:nnh + q A by application of the rule (net). Since S”’ is a subsequent 
of Sk, Sk were provable too, again contradicting Lemma 4.8. 
Corollary 4.16. Zf N is a leaf in a gapjump tree then the consequent of the o-extract 
of N is empty. 
Proof. Assume that the o-extract S of N were not empty. Then S would have right 
reducts. Any such right reduct S’ is unprovable by Lemma 4.14. But then there would 
be a next-time sequence N(S’) for S’ and and an edge (N,N(S’)). 0 
Proof of the Completeness Theorem 4.1. We have to show that finite unprovable 
sequents are not valid. More precisely, if S is a finite sequent which is unprovable in 
LB, then there exists a TB-interpretation K for S which falsifies S. 
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Let G(S) be a gapjump tree for S. We define the following TB-interpretation K = 
(T, {DB}BET, {%}str) where 
(1) T is the set of all occurrences of reduction branches (in the next-time sequences) 
in G(S). For the remaining part of this proof we use the letter B for occurrences of 
branches and B for the branch corresponding to B. Moreover we introduce the following 
partial order: 
If B and B’ are two occurrences within the same next-time sequence (pi)iew then 
therearei,jEws.t.B=BiandB’=pi.WesetB<B’ifi<jandB’<Bifj<i. 
Clearly B = B’ for i = j. 
If B, B’ are occurrences in different next-time sequences N, N’ (which are nodes of 
G(S)) then B < B’ iff there is a path from N to N’ in G(S). Evidently, the order type 
of < is in Y-. 
(2) For every B E T, DB is the set of all free variables V(B) occurring in B. Note 
that by the definitions of a next-time sequence (4.10) and of a gapjump tree (4.12) 
V(B) C V(B’) if B < B’. Thus we obtain DB C D ~1 for B < B’ (second condition of 
Definition 2.2) 
(3) Definition of the evaluation function SB for B E T: 
Set Se(a) = a for a E DB (note that elements of DB are available as constant symbols 
in the extended language). If A is an atomic formula, we define S&4) = T if A occurs 
in the antecedent of a sequent occurring in B and = I otherwise. 
We have to show that this truth assignment is consistent, i.e., it is impossible that an 
atomic formula A occurs in an antecedent and in a consequent of a sequent in B. Thus 
let B = (Si)iEw. By construction of a reduction tree we have sub*(&) c sub*(Sj) for 
i < j (see Definition 3.8). In particular, all atomic formulas occurring in the antecedent 
(consequent) of Si also occur in the antecedent (consequent) of Sj. Thus if A occurs 
in the antecedent of Si and in the consequent of Sj it must occur in both sides in 
Sk for k 2 max(i,j). This, however, contradicts the definition of reduction branches 
in a reduction tree (Definition 4.2), as B would be closed. So SS is consistently 
defined. 
It remains to show that K, as defined above, is indeed a countermodel to S. It suffices 
to show the following: (*) If F is a formula occurring in the antecedent (consequent) 
of a sequent in a reduction branch B (in a next-time sequence N occurring as a node 
in G(S)) then KB(F) = T (Ks(F) = I). Then, by Definition 2.2 and by the finiteness 
of S, (the implication corresponding to) S is falsified in K, as KB~(S) = I (Bo being the 
first reduction branch in the root of G(S)). Note that F cannot occur in an antecedent 
of S and in a consequent of S’ for two sequents S, S’ in B. The reasons are the same 
as for atomic formulas described above. We prove (*) by induction on the logical 
complexity of F. 
If F is an atomic formula (logical complexity 0), then (*) follows from Ks(F) = 
Se(F) and the definition of Sg. Suppose that (*) has been shown for all formulas 
of logical complexity <n. Let F be a formula of logical complexity n + 1. If the 
outermost logical symbol is not a temporal operator (0, o) then the reduction to the 
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case <n follows exactly the classical first-order case (see [ 14, Ch. 1, Section 81). It 
remains to handle the cases F = q F’ and F E o F’ for some formula F’. 
(1) F = OF’: 
Let us assume that F occurs in the antecedent (consequent) of a reduction branch B. 
Because B is a branch in a next-time sequence there is a successor S’ w.r.t. B (see 
Definition 4.7) on which the next reduction branch starts (see Definition 4.10). By 
definition of successor, F’ occurs in the antecedent (consequent) of S’, which is the 
first sequent of the successor branch B’. By the induction hypothesis, Kat(F’) = T 
(KB,(F’) = I). By Definition 2.2, Ka(F) = Ks(oF’) = Kaf(F’). As F must occur on 
the same side as F’ we conclude that (*) holds for F. 
(2) F = OF’: 
(a) F occurs in the antecedent of a sequent in a reduction branch B in the next-time 
sequence N: 
By the semantics of IJ we have KB(F) = T iff for all B’ s.t. B6B’ it holds that 
KB~(F’) = T. So let us assume that F occurs in the antecedent of the sequent S; 
in B. Then ooF’ must occur in (the antecedent of) a sequent Sj for some j > i. 
By definition of a next-time sequence N, q F’ must occur in (the antecedent of) the 
successor of B. By induction, q F’ occurs in the antecedent of every sequent in every 
reduction branch in this next-time sequence. Hence, q F’ occurs in the union on’ and 
in the antecedent of the o-extract of N. By definition of right reducts and the gapjump 
tree then, q F’ also occurs in the antecedents of all (initial) reduction branches in the 
successor nodes N’ of N in G(S). By the same arguments as before, we have that q F’ 
occurs in the antecedent of every sequent in every reduction branch B’ > B. Every 
reduction branch containing oF’ in the antecedent of some sequent also contains F’ 
in the antecedent of some sequent (by (o:left) reduction). Hence, by the induction 
hypothesis, KB~(F’) = T for all B’>,B and therefore Ks(F) = T. 
(b) F occurs in the consequent of a sequent in a reduction branch B in the next-time 
sequence N: 
By definition of (o:right) reduction, which is binary, there is a sequent in B which 
either contains (in the consequent) F’ or o q F’. In the former case we have immedi- 
ately, by the induction hypothesis, that KB(F’) = I and hence Ks(F) = 1. Otherwise, 
observe that the successor of B contains q F’ in the consequent. We have two cases: 
(i) either all reduction branches > B in N contain ooF’, or (ii) some branch B’ 
contains F’ in the consequent of some sequent. The former holds if at every (o:right) 
reduction of F in N the right premise lies on the reduction branch, the latter if in some 
reduction the left premise does. Case (ii) is handled as above. For case (i), observe 
that q F’ occurs in (the consequent of) every successor sequent of branches B’ > B in 
N. Thus, by definition of the o-extract q l7, -+ o/iv of N, OF’ belongs to q AN. Then 
there is some right reduct of N of the form ofl~ -+ F’. By Lemma 4.14 this right 
reduct is unprovable and thus is the initial sequent of the first reduction branch B’ of 
some successor node N’ of N in G(S). By the induction hypothesis, KB~(F’) = 1. 
Since B < B’ the semantics of q gives us KB(~F’) = 1. 
This concludes the proof of (*) and we have shown that K falsifies S. q 
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Remark 4.17. If the original sequents may be infinite, in particular, of unbounded 
logical complexity, then we no longer have a well-founded ordering on the sequents. 
On the other hand, the reduction steps which yield infinite sequents in the proof keep 
the logical complexity of formulas occurring in the sequents bounded. Hence, if the 
starting sequent is of bounded logical complexity (in particular, if it is finite), we have 
a well-founded order. Otherwise, the induction proof is problematic. 
5. TL versus TB 
It should be interesting to compare the two logics TL and TB. A comparison from 
the viewpoint of expressibility would clarify the possible application of TB in a pro- 
gram specification and verification environment. Such an analysis, however, would go 
beyond the scope of the present article. An analysis from a logical point of view 
can be given more easily. Here the comparison centers around the induction rule in 
propositional TL (see [7]), 
A-+BA+oA 
A+oB 
ind 
and the weaker necessitation rule of TB. 
Proposition 5.1. ( 1) The propositional fragment of TB is decidable. 
(2) The fragment of TB without o is equal to S4. 
(3) The monadic fragments of TL and TB are undecidable. 
(4) The fragment of TB without q is axiomatizable by LK plus (nex). 
(5) The fragment of TB without q is equal to the fragment of TL without q . 
Proof. (1) sub*(r + A) is finite. (2) LB without o collapses to the sequent calculus 
for S4 given in [4]. (3) Follows from the undecidability of monadic modal predicate 
logic; see below. (4) A cut-free proof can contain (o:left), (o:right), or (net) only if 
q occurs in the end-sequent. (5) By (4), a proof has to be found before jumping over 
the first gap iff one exists. Cl 
In contrast to (3) above, the monadic fragment of TB without q (and hence, by (5), 
the fragment of TL without q ) is decidable as discussed in the following. 
Proposition 5.2. It is decidable if a monadic temporal formula containing no u’s is 
satisjiable. 
Proof. Note that o distributes over all propositional connectives. Hence, any formula 
F containing no o’s is equivalent to a formula of the form vi Kj, where 
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where Lj. k is a negated or unnegated atomic formula. F is satisfiable iff Kj is satisfiable 
for some j. Consider the set T(K) = T,(K) U PI with 
V OUi+a”Li,l(tk) 1 I,k,ek <aI 
i 
where tk are constant symbols, and O”Li,k(tl) is considered as a propositional literal 
LYkl , , : K is satisfiable iff T(K) is satisfiable in classical propositional logic. 0 
So already the monadic fragments containing q but not o are undecidable. It is worth 
to recapitulate the construction of the proof of Kripke [6]: A binary predicate P(x, y) 
can be encoded in monadic temporal logic as P’(x, y) = o(Pi(x) A Pz(y)). Let F be 
a formula in the language of predicate logic, and F’ be obtained from it by replacing 
n-ary predicates P(xi ,..., x,) by o(P,(x,) A . . . A P,,(x,)). If F is valid, then F’ too, 
it being a substitution instance of F. If F is not valid, then we construct a temporal 
countermodel for F’. Let M be a (first-order) structure in which F is not satisfied. 
By the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem, we can assume M to be countable. We can 
enumerate all n-tuples of elements of the domain M using a function e. Let T be 
W, and Sj(Pi) = { a I a is the ith component of the jth (in e) n-tuple of M. So } ‘ff 
o(Pl(al) A.. . A !‘,(a,)) is true in (w, {Di = M}iEw, {Si}iEw) iff M + P(al,.. . ,a,). 
As remarked above, the undecidability of the monadic fragments of TL and TB fol- 
lows from the undecidability of dyadic predicate logic and the above construction. We 
have two immediate consequences: First, the monadic fragment of TL (with o) is not 
even axiomatizable, since we can replace the function symbols 0, I, +, ’ by (a unary, 
a binary, and two ternary) predicate symbols. These predicate symbols can in turn 
be replaced by temporal constructions of the kind used above; so non-axiomatizability 
follows from the non-axiomatizability of the full logic (see Section 2). A second in- 
teresting consequence is that already the fragment with only one monadic predicate 
symbol (but including o) is undecidable: with some adjustment to the construction 
of the countetmodel in the proof above, a binary predicate can also be encoded by 
o(P(x) A oP(y)). We do not know, however, whether the corresponding fragment of 
TL is still not axiomatizable. 
Even without a deep analysis it is obvious that propositional TL is decidable by 
embedding it into the monadic second order logic of one successor of Biichi [3]. (A 
decision method based on a similar reduction method as the one used here for TB 
can be found in [2].) For the same reason, the quantijed propositional variant of TL 
262 M. Baaz et al. I Theoretical Computer Science 160 (1996) 241-270 
Table I 
TL TB 
Propositional 
Monadic w/o 0 
Monadic 
Quantified propositional 
Full first-order 
Decidable Decidable 
Equal and decidable 
Not axiomatizable Undecidable 
Decidable Not axiomatizable? 
Not axiomatizable Axiomatizable 
is decidable. We do not know whether quantified propositional TB is decidable. Note 
that even though propositional TB - o equals S4, the propositionally quantified logics 
differ. Hence, the result of Kremer [5, III.l], i.e., that propositional S4 is recursively 
isomorphic to second-order logic, is of no help here. We conjecture, however, that 
quantified propositional TB is not axiomatizable as well. In summary, we have the 
situations shown in Table 1. 
6. Resolution for TB 
A practical consequence of the cut-free completeness of LB is the ability to construct 
a resolution calculus. The exact relationship between cut-free proofs in sequent calculus 
and resolution proofs has been investigated at length by Mints [ 10, 1 I]. This relationship 
is also the starting point for very fruitful investigations into resolution systems and 
strategies for other non-classical logics, e.g., linear logic (see [15]). 
The resolution procedure for TB works as follows: The formula F to be proved (7F 
to be refuted) is translated to clause form via translation rules based on the calculus LB. 
The translation is structure preserving, and the literals have the form (~)[,4l(ai,. . . , a,), 
where A is the sub-semi-formula corresponding to this literal, and ai, . . ., a, are free 
variables or constant symbols. A clause is an expression of the form C, where C is 
a set of literals. A clause may carry a variable restriction, denoted Ca, meaning that 
a resolution involving C is only allowed if a does not occur in the resulting clause 
and if a is not substituted into. The rules are the resolution and factoring rules, plus 
two rules corresponding to the (net) and (nex) rules. By Lemma 2.5 and replacement 
of free variables with constant symbols, we can assume that F is closed and does not 
start with q or o. 
Definition 6.1. Let F be a semi-formula, and let ~11, . . ., a, be all the constant symbols 
and bound variables without matching quantifier in order of occurrence. Then the code 
of F is defined as [FJ(alo,..., cr,cr), where [FJJ is an nary predicate symbol, and rr 
is a canonical renaming, mapping ai, . . .,an to new free variables. 
The axiom set Ax(F) is defined as the smallest set satisfying the following: Let 
P(ai,. ..,a,,) and P(pi,_. . ,/?,,) be two atomic sub-semi-formulas of F with the same 
predicate symbol. Then the clause {~[P(E)l(yi,. . . , yn), [P(j)](yl,. . . , y,)} E Ax(F), 
where yi = t~~cn.9, with u the renaming as above and 6 a most general unifier of 
(QG,..., ~0) and (BI~G...,~,P). 
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Table 2 
A Occurrence CF(A) 
-B 
-B 
BAC 
BAC 
BVC 
BVC 
B>C 
B>C 
W)B 
Wx)B 
(hx)B 
Wx)B 
q B 
q B 
POS 
neg 
POS 
neg 
POS 
nets 
PO s 
neg 
POS 
neg 
POS 
neg 
POS 
neg 
{{-UBl>-II4l~~ 
{{~UBl>~UCll~UB A Cll)) 
{{UBlL-UB A cnh wndB A cm 
{bow, UB v cn), c-ucnm v m 
mma~w v m 
ma UB 3 cn). {-ucn3 us 3 w 
{{-um ucn. -UB 3 WI 
{{~uB(x)ll(~)> uW’x)B(xW~ 
((I[B(x)n(a),lU(v~)B(x)D}) 
((luBn(a).u(L)B(x)n)} 
{{UBn(a).lu(3x)B(x)n)~) 
mm -uow ww 
mBn, -uom wm -wn~~ 
The clause translation Cl(F) is the following set of clauses: Cl(F) = U{&(A) 1 
A E sub(F)} u Ax(F) u { {l[F]( a,c, __ .,ano}}, where CF(A) is given by Table 2. 
Here, a stands for ox in the code for A(x), g is the same for all literals in a clause 
in C,=(A), and positive and negative occurrences are defined as usual. 
Note that there are no translation rules for formulas with outermost symbol o, just 
as there are no introduction rules (without restrictions) for o in LB. This is clear, 
since there is no relation between A and oA which depends only on A. 
Definition 6.2. The degree deg(A) of a semi-formula A is the number of occurrences 
of logical symbols except q and o in A. The degree of a clause is 
deg(C) = O” 
if C = 0, 
max{deg(A) 1 [A] E C or -[A] E C} otherwise. 
Note that max{deg(A) 1 A E (sub(F)\ {F})} < deg(F), since F is assumed to be 
prefix-free (see the comments above). 
The resolution calculus for TB consists of the the following rules: 
Cu{UAAll(~l,...,an>,UAD(~l,...,~n)} 
cou mm21,...,~,k~ 
fact 
c u {+4n(al,. . . ,u,)) c’u {umh,...,bd~ 
cc \ ~lu4h.. . , a,)}>ou(c’\{~An(bl,...,b,)})a res 
where cr is the most general unifier of (al,. . . , a,) and (bt, . . . , bn) and it is assumed that 
the resolved clauses are variable disjoint (i.e., by renaming variables). The resolution 
rule is subject to the following restrictions: 
(1) deg(CU C’)2 min(deg(CU {+Ul}bkg(C’U {11All})>; 
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(2) If one of the two resolved clauses is restricted on the variable a, then o(a) = a 
and a does not occur in (C\{--fAJ(a~,...,u,)})aU(C’\{[[AJJ(b~,...,b,)})a 
{quad,-.., ‘(~AII~,UB~II,...,UB~D)(“) 
{dlOAlll,..., ~aOA1n,~OB1n,...,IIOB1n)(=) nex, 
The application of the rules (nex,) and (net,) is restricted so that the resulting literals 
are still within sub(F). The calculus, therefore, depends on F; we actually are giving 
a construction schema for resolution calculi for each F. 
The following should be noted about the variable restriction: 
Proposition 6.3. In any resolution inference, 
(a) there is never a restriction on more than one variable in any one clause, and 
(b) at most one of the two premises carries a restriction. 
Proof. (a) Resolution removes all restricted variables (condition (2) above) from the 
resolvent, and the property holds of all input clauses. 
(b) First of all, restricted clauses are input clauses in Cl(F) corresponding to pos- 
itive occurrences of V or negative occurrences of 3 (or are derived from them by 
applications of (nex,), but not using other rules; cf. (a)). A resolution inference 
with two premises which both carry restrictions would be (up to leading o’s) of the 
form 
Other constellations are ruled out by the degree restriction on resolution. Since neither 
a nor a’ may be substituted into by the unifier o, they cannot stand opposite each 
other. Instead, they must unify with two other variables 6’ and b, respectively, i.e., 
o(b’) = a and a(b) = a’. But then the restricted variables would occur in the resulting 
clause, violating condition (2) of resolution. 
Example 6.4. Consider the formula q o(V~‘x)A(x) >(Vx)o oA(x). The sub-semi-formulas 
are: 
SI = A(x), S, = oA(x), 
S, = o q oA(x), S4 = q oA(x), 
S5 = (Vx)ooA(x), s6 = (vx'x)A(x), 
s, = ooo(vx)A(x), s8 =O(vxk)A(x), 
s, = q o(vx)A(x), Slo = qo(Vx)A(x) >(Vx) q o A(x). 
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A resolution proof is given by: 
Example 6.5. By contrast, consider the formula F = P(f) >(Vx))P(x), which is not 
valid. Without the eigenvariable condition, we would have the following derivation of 
the empty clause: 
For the resolution step (res*) to work, either a(a) = b, or o(b) = a. The former 
case is expressly forbidden, in the latter case the restricted variable would appear in 
the resulting clause. 
Theorem 6.6. The resolution calculus for TB is sound: if 0 is derivable from Cl(F), 
then b F. 
Proof. We show how a resolution derivation p not using the goal clause {-[F]} can 
be translated to an LB-derivation. Associate to each clause C in p the substitution Ac = 
rr6, where o is the original renaming of the bound variables and constants in sub-semi- 
formulas of F whose code occurs in C, and 8 is the cumulative substitution of the sub- 
derivation in p ending in C. In effect, if [,4(x)1( a is a literal in C, then A(x)& is the ) 
formula A(a). If p ends in a clause C: {+i](& ), . . . , ltA,,](&), [BJj(& ), . . . , I[B,,J(& 
we obtain an LB-proof of SC: A’,&, . . . , Ai& -+ B’,&, . . . , B&. If C carries a variable 
restriction, the restricted variable is bound by a weak quantifier in Sc. We argue by 
induction on the length of p: 
h = 1. p consists of a clause C from Cl(F) \ {-BF]} only: If C E Ax(F), say, 
C = {l[p(E)n(z), [P(&(a)}, the sequent P( -) a + P(Z) is the corresponding axiom. 
If C = C,V(A), where A E sub(F), then we construct an LB-proof of SC. We present 
here only some cases: 
( 1) C = { { +A], -[BJ. [A A B]}}. The corresponding proof is: 
A+A B+B 
A,B+AAB 
A: right. 
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(2) C = {{jIA(x)](a), [(Kx)A(x)]}“}, The corresponding proof is: 
(3) C = {{[A(x)](a), -[(Vx)A(x)]}}. The corresponding proof is: 
A(a) + A(a) 
(Vx)A(x) + A(u) v’: left. 
(4) C = {{[onA], -[DA]}. The corresponding proof is: 
ooA -+ ooA 
q A -+ ooA 
0: left. 
h > 1: We distinguish cases according to the last inference in p. Let N denote the 
negative and P the positive set of literals in a clause, and r,v and Ap its translations, 
respectively. 
(1) The last inference in p is a resolution where the premises do not carry a variable 
restriction: 
C: TN u P u {[A](G)} C’: TN’ u P’ u {-[A](6)} res 
-Na u 7N’a u Pa u P’a 
By induction hypothesis, we have LB-proofs rt, rc’ of I7ly + &Ah-(G) and A&(&), 
n&n + Apt. The unifier o does not substitute into eigenvariables of rr or 7~‘. We obtain 
a proof: 
: 7ra : 7c’a 
fl,!Ja ---f &a,A(ti)a A(b)a,flNta 4 &a 
nN0, n,la + Apa, &la 
cut 
(2) The last inference in p is a resolution where one premise contains the restricted 
variable a: 
TN u P u {[A](u)}’ TN’ u P’ u {-[A](b)} 
TNa U TN’s U Pa U P’a 
res 
By Proposition 6.3, a resolution involving restricted variables can only take this form. 
By induction hypothesis, we have LB-proofs rr, rc’ of zf~ + &A(u) and (Vx)A(x), 
nN, + Apt. The unifier a does not substitute into restricted variables (i.e., eigenvari- 
ables of R, K’). Since u is restricted, we have a(u) = a and a(b) = a, so b cannot 
occur in the resulting clause. Hence, it satisfies the eigenvariable condition. We obtain 
a proof: 
: 71a 
nNa + &a,A(b)a : rc’a 
fl,@ --$ Ape, (vXk)A(X)a ‘Iright (Vx)A(x), ZZi,a + Apta 
nNa,nNla + Apa,Apla 
cut 
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(3) The last inference in p is (fact): 
++’ u P U {(~MMl(4~ ( Ml(~)~ fact 
-Na U Na U ((7)I[A](fi)a} 
By induction hypothesis, we have a proof n of ZZN + &,A(G),A(&) (or A(G),A(6), 
IIN + /ip). Since there are no restrictions on variables, we can rename 6 via a(bi) = 
a; in rr. With contraction, we obtain a proof of I7Na + &a,A(G) (or A(a),lT~a -+ 
(4) The last inference in p is (net,). Add a 
(5) The last inference in p is (nex,). Add a 
If there were a resolution proof of 0 which 
(net)-inference to the LB-proof. 
(nex)-inference to the LB-proof. 0 
does not use the goal clause {-IF]}, 
then we could translate that into an LB-proof of the empty sequent -+. Such a proof, of 
course, is impossible. Hence, any resolution derivation of 0 must use the goal clause 
{-[Fj}. By the degree restriction, the last inference in such a derivation must be 
a resolution between {RF]} and {-[Fn}. A resolution derivation of {[F]} can, as 
above, be translated into an LB-proof of + F. 
Remark 6.7. Observe that the degree restriction on the resolution rule is necessary for 
soundness. Otherwise, e.g., P > q P would have the following proof: 
res 
In fact, a formula 1F has a refutation without degree restriction iff /= OF, but b OF 
is not equivalent to k=F (in contrast to q and o; cf. Lemma 2.5). 
Theorem 6.8. The resolution calculus for TB is complete: if FF, then 0 is derivable 
from Cl(F). 
Proof. We give, for each LB-proof A of a sequent + F, a resolution proof of 0 
from Cl(F). By Theorem 4.1, we can assume that n is cut-free, analytic, that its 
axioms are atomic, and by Proposition 3.5 that it contains no weakenings. Let il + A 
be a sequent in n. As can be easily seen, a formula A occurs positively (negatively) 
in I7 -+ n iff it occurs positively (negatively) in F. Furthermore, every formula A 
in 71 corresponds to exactly one sub-semi-formula A’ of F, which can be determined 
by tracing the formula A downwards through n. We translate n to a resolution proof 
p of {[F]} by induction on its subproofs R’: If n’ ends in Il + A, then p’ ends 
in 7Nn U PA, where the semi-formulas whose codes occur in II’ U A’ are those sub- 
semi-formulas of F corresponding to the formulas in IZ + A. There is no variable 
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restriction on the last clause in p’. We present here some cases: 
(1) 7~’ is an axiom: 
Translate P(Z) + P(a) to a clause {lIIP(cc)n(a),I[P(P)n(a)}, where P(E) (P(p)) is 
the sub-semi-formula of F corresponding to the left (right) P(a). (This clause is in 
Ax(F).) 
(2) rc’ ends in a contraction on a formula A: 
By induction hypothesis, we have a resolution proof of 7Nn UPA U {IL;a’](Z), [A’](b)} 
without restriction of variables. (A’ is the sub-semi-formula of F corresponding to A.) 
Apply (fact). 
(3) rc’ ends in (kright): 
By induction hypothesis, we have resolution proofs ending in TNn U PA U {[A’]} and 
7Nnl U Pnl U {El?‘]}. The clause {TEA’], +?],[A’ A B’]} is in Cl(F). We obtain a 
resolution proof: 
(4) n’ ends in (V:left): 
By induction hypothesis, we have a resolution proof ending in { -$A’(x)](a)} U 1Nn U 
PA}. The clause {[A’(x)](b), -[(Vx)A’(x)]} IS in Cl(F). We obtain a resolution 
proof 
(5) 7~’ ends in (V:right): 
By induction hypothesis, we have a resolution proof of -Ii’ U A U {[A(x)](a)}}. 
The clause {+(x)](b), [(Vx;r)A(x)]}6 is in Cl(F). We obtain the resolution 
proof 
+‘n UP/I U’{U&>llW~ {-lI&)ll(b)~ U(vW(x)D~b 
+n U PA U {U(v~‘x)A(x)ll~ 
Note that the conditions on b in the right premise are met, since u satisfies the 
eigenvariable condition. 
(6) n’ ends in (o:lefi): 
By induction hypothesis, we have a resolution proof of {-[A’& T[O DA’]} U -NnU 
PA. The clauses {[A’], -[ok]} and {[onA’], +A’]} are in Cl(F). We obtain a 
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resolution proof: 
(7) rt’ ends in (nex): 
Append a (nex,)inference to the resolution proof to obtain p’. 
(8) 7~’ ends in (net): 
Append a (net,) inference to the resolution proof to obtain p’. 
Note that in the translation to resolution, the restriction on the rules are all satisfied. 
The unifiers can be chosen so that only the variables in the clauses from Cl(F) are 
substituted into. Given a proof rt of + F we thus have a resolution proof p of {[Fn} 
from clauses in Cl(F). By resolving with {-[F]} E Cl(F), we obtain 8. 0 
The translation above shows actually that a refinement of resolution is complete, 
namely where every resolution step has to involve at least one input clause, i.e., a 
clause form Cl(F). The resolution method developed here differs significantly from the 
resolution method of Robinson developed for classical clause logic, hence the fact that 
“input resolution” is complete is not a contradiction to the well-known fact that input 
resolution in the classical case is not complete. 
7. Conclusion 
We have seen how the passage from a non-axiomatizable temporal semantics to 
an axiomatizable one is paralleled by an extension of the completeness proof of the 
propositional logic. The point where the proof fails for TL is where a true formula 
starting with q is reduced, even infinitely often, but no derivation can be obtained. The 
extension of the semantics is prompted by this phenomenon, and makes a complete 
reduction of the formula possible. The reduction discussed here is very similar to 
Kroger’s completeness proof for propositional TL. This prompts the question of how 
to extend similar propositional completeness proofs to the first-order case by avoiding 
non-axiomatizability of the standard semantics by extension of the semantics itself. 
A candidate for such investigations would be, e.g., infinite-valued Lukasiewicz logic. 
It also prompts the question for a characterization of classes of formulas, where a 
sequent calculus is complete for the original semantics, say, as those formulas where 
the reduction works. 
It is quite natural to ask, whether the predicate logic of linear time with gaps (the 
structures being sequences of o-segments) is axiomatizable or not; let us call this 
logic TLG. Indeed even the pure o-part of TLG is not axiomatizable. This result can 
be obtained by reducing the problem to the non-axiomatizability of the infinite-valued 
Giidel logic with truth values from the set {A In E iV - (0)) U (0). However, the proof 
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of this result is quite involved, placing it outside the scope of this paper. It will be 
presented elsewhere. 
Another problem which has not been addressed in depth so far is the correspon- 
dence between temporal logics discussed here, and number theory. The proof of non- 
axiomatizability of TL by reduction to arithmetic, and the “induction” rule of propo- 
sitional TL suggest that there is a close relation. This suggestion is supported by our 
result: the semantics of TB is a “non-standard” semantics, similar to non-standard 
models of arithmetic. Viewed this way, it is not as surmising that TB would have a 
complete axiomatization. 
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